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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLENE RAE TURNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.

Case No. 17257

THOMAS DE LAN TURNER,
Defendant and Respondent.:

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant
from a Ruling of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable
J. Robert Bullock presiding, denying Plaintiff-Appellant's
Motion for New Trial and for Amendment of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-Appellant commenced this action in the
lower Court to obtain a Decree of Divorce.

Trial on the

issues was held on the 21st day of May, 1980, and based
thereon the Court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

The Decree

granted a divorce to the plaintiff, provided for the
division of the parties' property and debts, and for
payment of alimony and attorney fees.

The plaintiff
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filed a Motion for a New Trial and for Amendment of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce.

After submission of Memorandum

and Argument

the lower Court denied said Motion, prompting this
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have this Honorable
Supreme Court affirm the Ruling of the lower Court
denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial and for
Amendment of Findings of Fact and Conclusiorn of Law
and Decree of Divorce, and thereby affirming the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce entered by the Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant-Respondent will follow the pattern
of the Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief and the titles
"Plaintiff" and "Defendant" will be used herein.
The Defendant makes the following additions and correct·
ions to the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts.
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were inter-married
at San Leandro, California on June 26, 1971.

The

defendant brought assets into the marriage having a
value in excess of $29, 000. 00, R-55, which assets inclut
equity in a house in San Leandro, California, which thi'
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-3Defendant had purchased prior to the parties' marriage. The
Plaintiff had a negative net worth at the time of marriage
and brought no substantial assets into the marriage, T-36,37.
Both parties had previously been married and the Plaintiff had a minor child which she brought into the marriage.
The Defendant was the main support of the Plaintiff's
minor child during the period of their marriage,T-40. The
parties had no children as issue of their marriage.
At the time of their marriage the IP-fendant was employed
as a police officer by the Oakland City Police Department,
and had worked sufficient years to retire, but he worked
an additional year to vest pension rights in the Plaintiff,
T-55.

The Plaintiff was employed at the Bank of America

at the time of their marriage, and continued to be employed
there durin-g the peri6d of time the parties residea in
California.
It had been the Defendant's life long goal to move to
Utah and own and operate a small farm, T-15,54.

:t·'

In further-

ance of that goal the parties entered into contracts of
sale to purchase certain farm ground near Levan, Utah,
beginning in 1974.

In order that the parties could make

the payments on the farm property and acquire the necessary
farm machinery, the Defendant returned to his former trade
l

of iron worker.

i

worker for Kaiser Steel, at times working seven days a week,

·lu•

hf I

During 1975 and 1976, he worked as an iron
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twelve hours a day, T-56,57.

The Defendant during 1976

and 1977 came to Utah by himself and worked on an iron
work job at Kennecott Copper and lived in his truck camper
in order to earn additional money for farm machinery,
and on the weekends would come to Levan, Utah, to work
on the farm, Dep. of Thomas Turner -72.
In 1977, the Defendant sold his house in California and
moved with the Plaintiff to Levan, Utah. The parties purch·
ased what has been described as the Malmgren home in Levan,
Utah, using the proceeds of the sale of the Defendant's
house in California to purchase the house, R-54.

The

parties subsequently purchased what has been described as
the Horton home in Levan, Utah, during 1978, and used the
Malmgren home as a rental unit, R-53.
After moving to Utah the Defendant began to operate the
two farms the parties had previously purchased, with
minimal help from the Plaintiff, T- 77-25.
are generally

The two farms

described as the Christensen farm and the

Bendixen farm, which farms total 48 acres with associated
water stock.

The farms at the time of divorce hearing had

a total value by the defendant's testimony of $84,000.00

i
I

°1

1

$1,750.00 an acre, R-51.
At the time of the divorce the Defendant was 60 years o.c,·I
and had various health problems which prevented him from
further employment

as an iron worker, T-69.

The
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)
Plaintl'·

l

--5was 41 at Lhe time of the divorce, in good health, and
employed as a receptionist at a medical clinic.
The Court found trat the Plaintiff was entitled to a divorce from the Defendant on grounds of mental cruelty.
The Defendant also presented testimony to establish
grounds for his claim of mental cruelty as set forth
in his Counterclaim, T-64,65,66.

The Court made no

finding that the Defendant had transferred his affections
from the Plaintiff to another woman, and the Defendant had
no involvement with another woman until after the Plaintiff
had filed for divorce.
The Plaintiff testified at trial that her monthly budget
was $763.00, which amount included the $180.00 mortgage
payment on the Horton home, and her projected increase
after May, 1981, was as a result of a projected church
mission or college expense by her son from a previous
marriage, R-38.
Both parties employed attorneys and incurred attorneys'
fees, which they were obligated to pay, T- 87,88.
After a full trial on the merits the Court awarded the
Plaintiff the Horton home, a substantial portion of the
parties household furniture and appliances, the parties
car, and various other miscellaneous items.

The Defendant

was awarded the Malmgren home, the farms, the farm machinery,
and various other miscellaneous

items.

The Defendant was
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further ordered to make the monthly payments on the
Horton home and pay the Plaintiff a $10,000.00 cash
settlement.
Using the values placed upon the property by the
Defendant, and deleting the values of those items of
property which the parties brought into the marriage and
subtracting from the Defendant's total the $10,000.00
he was ordered to pay the Plaintiff and the $20,000.00

I

mortgage on the Horton home which he is obligated to

pay, the Plaintiff received a net distribution of $69,800.c:I
and the Defendant received a net distribution of $95,688.0u;
or 42% to the Plaintiff and 58% to the Defendant,

R-58.

Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce in
this matter the Defendant executed and delivered to the
Plaintiff a check for $10,000.00 with the endorsement on
the back "Received as full payment of the $10,000.00 due
and owing Shirlene Turner as part of the property settlement in the Decree of Divorce between Shirlene Turner and
Thomas D. Turner."

The Plaintiff has accepted said check

and cashed it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DIVIDING THE MARITAL PROPERTY.

This Court has stated on numerous occasions that ther:
is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division
of property, it is a prerogative of the trial court to mal1
whatever disposition of property as it deems fair, equit·
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i

-7able, and necessary for the protection and welfare of the
parties.

See Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 p2d 1080 (1977)

Hamilton v. Hamilton,

Utah, 562 P 2 d 235 (1977); Gramme

v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P 2 d 144 (1978).
Further this Court has also stated on numerous occasions

that the trial Court in a divorce action has consider-

able latitude of discretion in adjusting financial

and

property interests, and for the Plaintiff-Appellant to
prevail, she would have to prove that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly preponderated against the Courts findings, or that such a
serious inequity
discretion.

resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of

2
See Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P d 752 (1978)

2
Hansen v. Hansen, Utah,537 P d 491 (1975).

The Plaintiff

has not sustained her burden of establishing one of the
above mentioned
reversing the

factors that would warrant this Court in
decision of the trial court as to property

division.
Using some of the factors set forth in McDonald v.
2
McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P d 1066 (1951) and stated
in the Plaintiff's Brief, we obtain the following comparison between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
1. The defendant brought assets into the marriage having
a value in excess of $29,000.00; the plaintiff had
a negative net worth at the time of the marriage.
2.

The marriage between the parties had a duration
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-8of nine years, and no children were born as issue
of the marriage.
3. The defendant supported the plaintiff's minor
son from a previous marriage during the pa:iod of
their marriage.
4.
Both parties worked during periods of the marriage, with the defendant's income being substantially
more than the plaintiffs.
5. The defendant put forth extra effort to acquire
the Utah farm property and machinery, working
long hours and living under difficult conditions.
6. At the time of the divorce the defendant was
60 years old with health problems which prevented
his normal employment; the plaintiff was 41 in
good health, and employed as a receptionist at
a medical clinic.
7. The plaintiff's standard of living after the
divorce will be basically the same as before the
divorce; she is living in the same house with the
same furnishings, and sufficient income to cover her
monthly budget, and in addition she received $10,000.00
as part of the property settlement.
When reference is given to the above mentioned factors
it becomes clear that the division of the property made
by the lower Court herein permits the parties to pursue
their lives in as happy

and useful a manner as possible.

Further the division of property by the lower Court
will not likely lead to
and distress, and

additional economic difficulties

therefore this Court should affirm the

division of the property made by the lower Court.

See

Read v. Read, Utah, 594 P 2 d 871. (1979)
The defendant received the farm and farm machinery,
which had special significance to him because of his life
long dream to operate a small farm in Utah and because
of the extra sacrafice he had made to acquire those assets.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9The plaintiff received the better of the two houses,
free and clear of any obligation to pay the mortgage,
and essentially all of the furnishings and appliances
which the parties owned at the time of divorce.

In

addition she was awarded a $10,000.00 cash settlement
from the defendant.

After nine years of marriage, the

plaintiff went from a financial position of having a
negative net worth, to a position where she was awarded
nearly $70,000.00 in assets.

Clearly the lower Court

did not abuse its discretion in distributing the parties
assets in the manner that it did.
POINT II.

THE AWARD OF ALIMONY AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE
AND NOT AN ARUSE OF DISCRETION

This Court in recent cases has held that the purpose
of alimony is to provide post-marital support, and it
is not to be considered as a penalty to be imposed
upon the husband, or as a reward granted to the wife.
2
See Gramme v. Grarmne, Utah.587 P d 144,

(1978).

The criteria that should be used in determining
a reasonable award of alimony include financial conditions
and needs of wife, ability of wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and the ability of the husband
to provide support, See English v. English, Utah, 565
2
P d 409,

(1977).

The plaintiff testified at trial that her monthly
budget was $763.00, which amount included

the $180.00

monthly mortgage payment on the Horton home.

She
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-10further testified that she would need $225.00 a month
alimony until she could adjust her affairs otherwise,
based upon her then take-home pay of $540.00 per month,
T-28.

The trial Court ordered the defendant to pay

the Plaintiff alimony of $50.00 a month for 24 months,
and ordered him in addition to pay the $180.00 a month
mortgage payment on the Horton home.

The total monthly

support payment ordered by the lower Court was $230.00,
which exceeds the $225.00 requested by the Plaintiff.
Clearly there was not an abuse of discretion

in the

award of alimony if it exceeded the actual request by
the Plaintiff.
Mention is made in the Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief
that her monthly budget will increase in the future,
because of the

possible increased needs of her teenage

son from a former marriage.

The possibility of increased

future needs is not a proper consideration in the determination of present support payments.

The Plaintiff

because of her present ability to work and earn an income, '
and because of her age and the condition of her health
is in a much better position to provide for the future
support of herself and her son, than is the defendant.
As to the awarding of attorneys' fees, the Plaintiff
alleges that the trial Court errored in awarding the
Plaintiff only $500.00 attorney's fees rather than the
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-11$1,540.00 that was requested.

This Court has again

held that the reasonableness of the award of attorneys
fees is largely a matter within the discretion of
trial Court.
364 (1932)

See Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 U.

the

~ 12 P 2 d

2
, Weiss v. Weiss, 111 U. 353, 179 P d 1005

(1947).
Many of the same factors used to determine if there
was an abuse of discretion as to property division
and as to

award of alimony should be applicable, also,

as to the

award of attorney's fees.

In assessing the need of the Plaintiff for the
award of attorney's fees the Court should consider
the fact that the Plaintiff made no request for temporary attorney's fees prior to trial; and was employed
at the time of trial and the defendant was unemployed
with his only source of income being the $930.00 a month
pension check.

The plaintiff was also awarded a

$10,000.00 cash settlement which would provide a source
for payment of attorney's fees.

The defendant also had

to employ an attorney to represent his interests, to
whom he had to make payment.
The Plaintiff implies in her Brief that the trial
Court made a finding that $1,500.00 was a reasonable
attorney's fee and the Court made an oversight in
awarding only $500.00 on attorney's fees.

In fact

the Court only made a finding that the Plaintiff's
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-12attorney expended 30 hours in prosecution of the
suit and a reasonable fee per hour was $50.00 per
hour.

The award of $500.00 attorney's fees was not

an oversight as the Court made a direct ruling on
that amount when the Court denied the Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions

of Law.
Based upon the foregoing argument the lower Court
did not abuse its discretion in the award of alimony
and attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
The trial Court at the close of the trial herein
made the comment that in its view parties in a divorce
action usually

can made a better decision for them-

selves than the Court can, but when they force the
Court

to make those decisions, it can only base its

decisions upon the facts as it sees them and the laws.
Commenting further the Court stated that it obviously
couldn't do what both parties wanted, but it would
have to do what the evidence and the law indicates, T-88,81,
The trial Court, because of its nature, is in the best
position to evaluate the evidence and consider each
of the parties' position and then render a sound decision.
That is why this Court has consistently held in divorce
cases that the trial Court has considerable latitude of
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-13discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests of the parties, and this Court will not
reverse the decision of the trial Court unless there
has been a substantial error or a serious inequity
would result therefrom.
The Plaintiff-Appellant has not met the burden
of showing a substantial error or a serious inequity
with respect to the division of property, or to the
award of alimony and attorney's fees.

The Plaintiff's

standard of living will remain the same after the
divorce as before; she will be living in the same house
with the same furnishings,
income to cover her monthly

and will have sufficient
expenses.

In addition

she was awarded a $10,000.00 cash settlement which
she accepted as satisfaction of the property division
between the parties.
The award of the farm property to the Defendant
is not an abuse of discretion, given the special significance

of that property to the Defendant and the signi-

ficant extra work and effort he put forth to obtain it.
~

I

!

Based upon the facts herein and the argument setforth,
clearly the division of property and the award of alimony
and attorney's fees was within the latitude of discretion
of the trial Court and its judgment should be affirmed
by this Court.
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Respectfully submitted,

~-u---r_fdf;fr,;,
Donald J. Eyre/ Jr/ V
125 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
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